Proof that Tony Blair organised de Menezes assassination cover up from the very start
At the Home Office website here you can find the copies, of the extraordinary correspondence that the assassination of de Menezes by Kratos trained thugs provoked.
1. Letter from Sir Ian Blair to Sir John Gieve following the shooting of Mr Jean Charles de Menezes
In response to an FOI request for a copy of the letter sent by Sir Ian Blair, Metropolitan Police Commissioner to Sir John Gieve, Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, following the shooting of Mr Jean Charles de Menezes on 22 July.
The request outlined above resulted in the release of the information requested. For the sake of completeness, we are also publishing today, Sir John Gieve’s reply of 22 July to Sir Ian Blair’s letter and a letter of 22 July from Len Duvall, Chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority to Sir John Gieve.
NB: Sir Ian’s letter was incorrectly dated 21 July but was in fact sent on 22 July.
* Sir Ian Blair's letter to Sir John Gieve PDF alert .. ("incorrectly" dated 21 July but was in fact sent on 22 July.
"In the meeting we had with the Prime Minister yesterday....."
"I have therefore given instructions that the shooting that has just occurred at Stockwell is not to be referred to the IPCC and that they will give no acess to the scene at the present time."
There is considerable internal confusion here, was the meeting with the boy Tony on the 21st / 22nd ? ... "shooting just occurred" ... that doesn't accord with a letter written the following day.
What it does tell us is that the News of the World report today was quite accurate that the boy Tony was involved immediately (within 42 minutes (shades of Saddam's 45 mins) very quickly.. and indeed met both with Sir Ian Blair and Sir John Geive. The time date and location of this meeting (videoconfernece) is critical.
The result was, the Met kept the IPCC off the case for at least 5 days, wuite against the advice of sir John geive and the without the support of Len Duval Chairman of the MPA.
* Sir John Gieve's reply to Sir Ian Blair
"I do not believe that Section 17 can be suspended as you suggest.."
* Len Duvall's letter to Sir John Geive
"In regard to the suspension of Section 17 as proposed by Sir Ian, I have said that I am not sure that it is necessary or desirable...."
It is increasingly evident that Blair was fully aware that there had been an almighty fuck up - why involve the PM immediately ? Why suspend the IPCC ? Allegedly we have a master stroke against terrists, trebles all round ... but panic has set in immediately .. they cannot even get the fucking date right on the latter.
These letters really nail the lying bastards... and of course the cunning and lotahsome Blair has involved the PM from the get go in the cover up... and of course caused problems over recorded telconsd with Godlsmith and is gently blackmailing the Government over peers for pounds.
4 comments:
The media have taken their time to pick this up, the letter's been available a while . The story, and Blair's crumbling support, has also made The Times today. Who is framing whom?
Latest reports reaching Antagonist Twin Towers are of intense Polis activity in the Metropolis, akin to the levels of July 2005.
The v interesting thing now is the cross linking with the NOW report and Blair.
I think / hope the fucking fuckers are fucked
Blair Sir Ian is of course covering his ample buttocks - not for nothing did he go to Christ Church.
The whole circumstances of the meeting T Blair Ian Blair and Geive , when where need outing without dealy... perhaps Ken Livingston I presume ?
I've been suspicious of this whole thing from the beginning - but I genuinely believe that Sir Ian Blair didn't know until he has always claimed he has - the following morning. Blair's reaction can be condemned, but I think he was acting purely because he thought the terrorist danger was more important at that time.
The issue then seems to be how quickly the other senior officers knew - and the Screws claims this was by 9:45 and that they didn't tell Blair because he would probably have started crying like a baby. I wonder whether they knew much much earlier and whether the resulting media coverage, witness statements etc were an attempt to keep Blair out the loop but to still instigate as much as bluster so that the fact an innocent man had been killed wouldn't be discovered until the next day.
From the de Menezes Inquest, 6th November 2008 (Page 140), discussion of Ian Blair's letter to Gieve (Questions from Michael Mansfiled to MR STEVE SWAIN):
3 Q. First of all, have you seen this letter before?
4 A. Yes, I remember now, there was a bit of a discussion
5 about this when it was produced, at Scotland Yard, and
6 there was a debate about how to respond to it, if
7 I remember, and I was invited to be part of that
8 discussion.
9 SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT: Is this addressed to the
10 Permanent Secretary of the Home Office?
11 MR MANSFIELD: Yes, I think it is.
12 You see the date above that, 21 July, the very day,
13 it seems, of the attempted bombings that this letter
14 goes to the Home Office. I don't ask for the next page
15 but you will accept from me it is in fact a letter from
16 the Commissioner, Ian Blair. Can I just read the
17 paragraphs which I want to deal with, with you,
18 especially as you had some input:
19 "Dear John,
20 "Operation Kratos: suicide bombers.
21 "In the meeting we had with the Prime Minister
22 yesterday, I raised the issue of maximising the legal
23 protection for officers who had to take decisions in
24 relation to people believed to be suicide bombers."
25 May I pause there. The meeting therefore must have
Page 141
1 been on 20 July if this letter is accurate.
2 MR HORWELL: I am sorry to interrupt. The date must be the
3 22nd. The date on the letter must be wrong. If you
4 read the letter, it was written on the day of the
5 shooting.
6 MR MANSFIELD: Well, there may be a question about that.
7 I appreciate, and for the moment I'm not accepting that
8 it was --
9 SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT: We have not seen the whole of the
10 letter yet.
11 MR MANSFIELD: I was not in fact going to go through the
12 whole letter.
13 SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT: If there is a point to be made about
14 this, we ought to try to sort it out.
15 MR MANSFIELD: I would ask if we can be told when the
16 meeting was with the Prime Minister as well as when this
17 letter was started and finished.
18 I don't suppose you have answers to this?
19 A. No, I am afraid I don't. I remember a discussion about
20 this. I think it was either on the 21st or the 22nd,
21 but I can't remember.
22 Q. All right. Maybe we can --
23 SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT: Were you there? Did you go on it?
24 A. The meeting with the Prime Minister? No, sir, I didn't.
25 MR MANSFIELD: I think the next bit you probably have got
Page 142
1 some observations to make:
2 "This is clearly a fast-time decision-making
3 process, in which officers cannot risk the kind of
4 containment and negotiation tactics which would normally
5 be the case. Put simply, the only choice an officer may
6 have may be to shoot to kill in order to prevent the
7 detonation of a device. In due course [and this is the
8 sentence I want to ask you about] I believe we need
9 a document similar to the military rules of engagement
10 but time does not permit its creation at the present
11 time."
12 Then it goes on to Section 3, and then IPCC and
13 other matters in the letter.
14 SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT: Can we go on to see if there is
15 something in Mr Horwell's point that we can tell from
16 the letter when it was actually written.
17 MR MANSFIELD: You can only tell --
18 SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT: "the shooting that has just occurred at
19 Stockwell".
20 MR MANSFIELD: That's right.
21 SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT: That's what you had in mind, I imagine?
22 MR HORWELL: Sir, yes.
23 MR MANSFIELD: It may be a mistake at the top of the
24 left-hand corner; on the other hand, as it sometimes
25 happens --
143
1 SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT: Or it might have been started one
2 day --
3 MR MANSFIELD: Yes, and finished the next. I am less
4 concerned with the rest of the letter, and obviously
5 others can go into it if they wish. It's mostly about
6 the IPCC. I want to ask you, if I may, Mr Swain, about
7 the observation there which appears to suggest that
8 there isn't any document containing rules of engagement.
9 Do you see that?
10 A. I do, yes.
11 SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT: You agree with that? There is the blue
12 card which has Section 3 of the Act on it.
13 A. Yes, there is, and there is the training course that
14 officers undertake about when they can or can't use
15 firearms and the like situations.
16 SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT: Yes. We don't know what
17 the Commissioner had in mind but there is nothing that
18 an officer carries around with him?
19 A. No, there isn't, apart from the blue card.
20 SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT: Apart from the blue card which reads a
21 bit of law.
22 A. Yes.
23 MR MANSFIELD: I'm sorry to tax your memory about something
24 three years ago but you indicated that you had some
25 input here. Was the discussion at the highest level
144
1 within the Met a school of thought which was, I am
2 putting it bluntly: we will just have to shoot them and
3 that was being discussed and in terms of how it was
4 going to be put either to the Prime Minister or the
5 public; is that what it was all about, do you remember?
6 A. I mean, I don't really remember the detail of the debate
7 about how that unfolded and I'm sorry if that sounds
8 evasive. It's not meant to be like that. You know,
9 I was a part of the team that was looking at this.
10 I don't remember too much of the detail. So if you
11 don't mind, I actually think I would prefer to say
12 nothing about it. Because I can't remember enough
13 detail and I wouldn't want to say something that
14 somebody might contradict me on later on.
15 MR MANSFIELD: I will respect your position and end my
16 questions. Thank you very much.
We're still none the wiser...
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